March 2020 Auction Ends Thursday, March 26th, 5pm Pacific
This lot is closed for bidding. Bidding ended on 3/26/2020
Autograph draft letter signed by Major General William B. Franklin, just days after the disastrous Battle of Fredericksburg, where Franklin's command of the Left Grand Division had been criticized by his superior General Ambrose Burnside. Franklin here writes with Major General William F. Smith, proposing a new plan to take Richmond from the James River with specifics regarding troops needed, supply trains, communication lines and more. However, although such a route was already attempted in the Peninsula Campaign earlier in 1862, Franklin doesn't allude to that here, prompting a reply from Lincoln (see lots 11 and 136), questioning Franklin's earlier comment that the Army should be taken off the James River. Lengthy five page letter reads in full,
''To the President / The undersigned holding important commands in the Army of the Potomac, impressed with the belief that a plan of operations may be devised which will be crowned with success, and that the plan of campaign which has already been commenced cannot possibly be successful, present with diffidence the following views for consideration. Whether the plan proposed be adopted, or not, they consider it their duty to present these views, thinking that perhaps they may be suggestive to some other military mind in discussing plans for the future operations of our Armys in the East.
1. We believe that the plan of campaign already commenced will not be successful for the following reasons, viz / 1. The distance from this point to Richmond is 61 miles - / It will be necessary to keep open our communications with Aquia Creek Landing from all points of this route - / To effect this, the presence of large bodies of troops on the road will be necessary at many points. The results of making these detachments would be that the enemy will attack them, interrupt the communications, & the Army will be obliged to return to drive him away - / If the Railroad be rebuilt as the Army marches, it will be destroyed at important points by the enemy.
If we do not depend upon the railroad, but upon wagon transportation, the trains will be so enormous that a great deal of the strength of the Army will be required to guard them, and the troops will be so separated by the [crossed out: ''lengths of the''] trains, and the roads so blocked by them that the advance & rear of the Army could not be within supporting distance of each other - / 2. It is in the power of the enemy at many points on this route to post himself strongly, and defy us. The whole strength of our Army may not be sufficient to drive him away, and even were he driven away at great sacrifice of blood on our part, the result would not be decisive. The losses to him in his strong positions would be comparatively slight while ours will be enormous.
2. In our opinion any plan of campaign to be successful should possess the following requisites viz: / 1. All of the troops available in the East should be massed. / 2. They should approach as near to Richmond as possible without an engagement. / 3. The line of communication should be absolutely free from danger of interruption.
A campaign in the James River enables us to fulfil [sic] all these conditions more absolutely than any other [crossed out: ''point''] for - / 1. [crossed out: ''It enables us to concentrate our troops from the North & the South more quickly than it could the concentration] On the James River our troops from both North & South can be concentrated more rapidly than they can be at any other point - / 2. They can be brought to points within 20 miles of Richmond without the risk of an engagement. / 3. The communication by the James River can be kept up by the assistance of the Navy without the slightest danger of interruption -
Some of the details of this plan are the following - / We premise that by concentrating our troops in the East we will be able to raise 250000 men - / Let them be landed on both sides of the river as near Richmond as possible, 150000 on the North Bank & 100000 or more on the South Bank - All of them to carry three days' provisions on their persons, & 100 rounds of ammunition, without any other baggage than blankets & shelter tents & a pair of socks & a pair of [?]. Let it be understood that every third day a corps or Grand Div'n is provisioned from the river - If this arrangement be practicable (and we think it is) we get rid of all baggage, provisions, & Infantry Ammun[itio]n wagons, and the only vehicles will be the Artillery & its ammunition wagons & the ambulances. [Following sentence written at end of page] The mobility of the Army caused by carrying out these views will [crossed out: ''make it in''] be more like that of an immense partisan Corps, than a modern Army.
The two Armies marching up the banks may meet the enemy on or near the river - By means of pontoons kept afloat & towed so as to be reached at any point one Army can in a few hours cross to assist the others - It is hardly supposable that the enemy can have force enough to withstand the shock of two such bodies -
If the enemy decline to fight on the river, the Army on the South Bank or a portion of it will take possession of the railroads running South from Richmond, while the remainder will proceed to the investment or attack upon Richmond according to circumstances.
Whether the investment of Richmond leads to the destruction or capture of the enemy's army or not, it certainly will lead to the capture of the rebel Capitol, and the war will be on a better footing than it is now, or has any prospect prospect [sic] of being.
The troops available for the movement are the Army of the Potomac, the troops in Florida, South Carolina & North Carolina with the exception of those necessary to hold the places now occupied, the regiments now in process of organization, and those who are on extra duty, & furlough, deserters & Stragglers. The number of these last is enormous, and the most stringent measures must be taken to collect them - no excuse should be received for absence.
Some of the troops [crossed out: ''on the Upper Potomac''] in western Virginia might also be detached - / The transports should consist of ordinary steamers, and large ferryboats & barges. The ferry boats may become of the greatest use in transporting troops across James River. With the details of the movements we do not trouble you. Should the general idea be adopted these can be thoroughly digested & worked out by the Generals & their Staffs to whom the execution of the plan is committed. / The above signed by myself & Gen [William F.] Smith - & transmitted to Wash'n on the 21 of December 1862.''
Although Franklin dates his letter as 21 December, it was likely written 20 December, given the date referenced in President Lincoln's reply. Five page letter on five separate sheets measures 7.5'' x 11.5'', composed in pencil by Franklin. Folds, else near fine condition. A fascinating glimpse into the Union Army at its worst point, struggling to right an intractable War.
General William Franklin Autograph Draft Letter to Abraham Lincoln on a Plan to Take Richmond After Fredericksburg: ''...at great sacrifice of blood on our part, the result would not be decisive...''
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