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Excellent six page autograph letter signed by Dutch Admiral Conrad E.L. Helfrich concerning the World War II Battle of the Java Sea in 1942, a battle that ended disastrously for the Allies, with the Japanese taking the island of Java shortly thereafter. Helfrich, who represented The Netherlands at the Japanese surrender aboard the USS Missouri at the end of the war, writes to Emery Reves, the publisher of Winston Churchill's ''Memoirs of the Second World War'', disagreeing with Churchill's written account of the battle. In Helfrich's telling, the Japanese commander was very surprised by the strength of the Allied naval force and, with a little luck that the Japanese had instead of the Allies, the battle would have been won. He also criticizes the actions of the commanders of the U.S. and Australian ships USS Houston and HMAS Perth; both these ships sank during the battle. Letter dated 21 August 1952 from The Hague reads in full,
''Dear Sir, In Volume IV of Churchill's 'The Second World War', on page 129 and 130, the author wrote:
'To meet the attack on Java, for which large convoys were at sea, he formed two striking forces, the Eastern at Surabaya, under [Dutch] Admiral [Karel] Doorman, and the Western, of British ships, at Tanjung Priok, the port of Batavia. On the 25th, the western striking force, comprising the cruisers Hobart (Australia), Danae and Dragon, with the destroyers Scout and Tenedos, having made various attempts to find the enemy, were ordered to retire through the Sunda straits to Colombo, which they reached safely a few days later. Scarcity of fuel and the continuous air attack on Tanjung Priok were the reasons why the western striking force was dismissed at this juncture. Had they joined Admiral Doorman's eastern force, they could only have shared its fate.'
I hope you will permit me some remarks regarding this passage. The complete story I published in my 'Memoirs', Volume I, pages 373 etc...On February 21st 1942, I decided to form two striking Forces, a Western (W.S.F.) and an Eastern (E.S.F) my intention, however, was to concentrate both forces into one Combined Striking Force (C.S.F.), as soon as I had better information regarding probable Japanese landing places. The second reason, why I did not concentrate immediately all available ships in West or East Java, was technical, viz shortage of fuel. All available fuel was stored in Tanjung Priok, Sourabaja [sic, meaning Surabaya], and Tjilatjap (South coast). The most important fuel stations outside Java had already been destroyed, and I was not sure of supplies in [?]. I had to use both harbours: Tg. Priok and Sourabaja.
Initially the WSF, based in Tg. Priok, comprised heavy cruiser Exeter (British), light cruisers Hobart and Perth (Australia), small light cruisers Danae and Dauntless (British), British destroyers Electra, Jupiter, Encounter, Scout and Tenedos, and Dutch destroyer Evertsen.
Hobart had just arrived, Dragon (mentioned in Mr. Churchill's book) had already left with Admiral Hart USN, after I took over his command of the Allied Naval Forces on Feb. 14th, Evertsen was to join WSF after having finished her escort duties in the Indian Ocean.
ESF comprised Dutch cruisers De Ruyter (flag of Admiral Doorman), and Java, heavy USS Houston, Dutch destroyers Witte de With, Kortenaer and Banckert, and all available (5) U.S. destroyers.
Houston, however, was not available before Feb. 25th, and Banckert was lost during an air raid on Sourabaja.
I had been promised USS (cruiser) Phoenix after the (earlier) loss of Boyse [sic, meaning Boise], but she never appeared!
ESF was based on Sourabaja.
Both forces combined, they certainly were not too weak to launch a surprise attack. I knew that the Japanese underrated our remaining strength, due to the exaggerating bomber reports of the Japanese pilots during the war, which reports had been published by Tokyo-broadcast. The proof that I was right in this anticipation, has been furnished by Japanese data after the war.
After I received a report concerning a large Japanese convoy in Makassar - Straits, I decided at once to concentrate in the East.
Exeter, Perth, Electra, Jupiter and Encounter left in the afternoon of Feb. 25th for Sourabaja, and joined Doorman, without meeting any enemies, [?] day.
Only I decided, on the suggestion of my Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Palliser RN, to dismiss light cruisers Danae and Dauntless, with British (old) destroyers Scout and Tenedos, these ships not being suited for a real naval battle against fast, modern ships, because of lack of speed.
Hobart, which cruiser had been delayed on the 25th, because she was still fueling from a damaged British tanker at Tg. Priok, was ordered to escort the British light cruisers and destroyers through Sunda - straits, and to return to Tjilatjap, after the ships having reached the open Ocean. Hobart had finished refueling only on the 26th, and at that moment I deemed a lonely trip to Sourabaja in order to join the other ships of the Combined Striking Force, out of the question.
After the result of the battle in the Java Sea (27th) was known, I cancelled the order for Hobart to return, and she, with the remaining ships of the original WSF, proceeded to Colombo.
Evertsen was not yet ready with her escort duties. She was too late to join Doorman.
These are the facts. It is evident, therefore, that the original WSF was much stronger than the passage in Mr. Churchill's work indicates; and that the force which was dismissed on Feb. 25th (early morning) was not the original WSF, but only the remaining ships, after the concentration under Doorman's flag had been accomplished. Moreover: they were not dismissed because of scarcity of fuel and the continuous air attack on Tanjung Priok, but deliberately by tactical reasons.
My next remark regards the clause at the end of the passage: 'had they joined Admiral Doorman's eastern force, they could only have shared its fate.'
This remains to be seen.
The Japanese admiral was surprised, decidedly, to meet Doorman's Force. He had not expected so many (5) cruisers. In fact, his superiority was not, locally, large.
We now have information from Japanese sources, to the effect that:
1. he was surprised;
2. he suffered such damage on his two heavy cruisers during the first hour of the battle, that he considered the situation 'critical', until Exeter was hit in a way that she had to leave the battle. If Doorman, instead, had made such a hit on one of the two Japanese heavy cruisers with the same result, Doorman had been superior in force;
3. [?], immediately by the Japanese admiral ordered advancements of Japanese reinforcements in the vicinity, could not have changed the situation in his favour; these reinforcements, comprising heavy cruisers As[h]igara and Myoko, advancing at full speed, arrived only one and a half hours after the end of the battle. (these two heavy cruisers engaged the escaping Exeter and two destroyers later and finished the ships).;
4. On their way to Tanjung Priok, after the battle, Houston and Perth, undamaged, did not meet a single enemy ship or plane. It was nearly full morn[?] and they arrived on the 28th, at noon, at Priok, in broad daylight,
5. A second surprise the Japanese suffered during the night Feb. 28th - March first, in Bantam Bay (Western Java north coast), where Houston and Perth, trying to escape from Priok through Sunda straits, passed along [plus or minus) 50 Japanese transports, with small protection, the Japanese main-body being about 15 miles up north. Why Houston and Perth did not grasp this splendid opportunity to smash all transports, instead of continuing their course to Sunda straits, I cannot explain. Later on, after arrival of the Japanese heavy cruisers and destroyers of the main-body, they were lost.
I am sure, sooner or later the true and complete story will [?], how many chances still were left to accomplish 'something great', with incalculable consequences.
Too often our fight in the Netherlands Indies has been called 'a courageous but useless fight.'
It was courageous, but not useless.
If we had been more lucky, we could have told quite another - and better - story.
Yours sincerely, / CEL Helfrich''
Composed on three sheets of Helfrich's stationery, each measuring 8.25'' x 10.5''. Minor soiling, overall near fine.
Letter is accompanied by several memorandums within Churchill's office: the retained copy of Reves' reply letter to Helfrich; Reves' letter to Churchill; and a lengthy memo to Churchill from Commodore George Gordon Allen - one of Churchill's ''Syndicate'' who helped research his Memoirs, agreeing with some of Helfrich's claims but disputing others as ''unfortunate'' and ''wishful thinking.''