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Richard Feynman handwritten manuscript, composed while Feynman served on the Rogers Commission to investigate the cause of the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster. Feynman appears to try to understand the faulty decision making at NASA and Morton-Thikol that led to the disaster, writing free association on these two pages in a fascinating diary-style document. Feynman dates the document as ''Sunday Mar 29, 1985'', however 29 March doesn't fall on a Sunday in either 1985 or 1986, so it's unclear when the document was written, although it seems to be from the time of the Rogers Commission.
He writes at the top, ''ERR LOGIC'' and ''Distinguish weather (each time new) from repeated effects (cracks, erosion).'' He then lists his thoughts under four points on the first page, reading in part:
''1. If some condition is accepted as 'ready for flight' it must be safe. For nothing unsafe would be flown. If the flight succeeds the position is vindicated.
2. If the same condition was accepted ([therefore] safe) for a previous flight it is accepted again. For if [it] were unsafe it would not have passed a previous review.
3. Therefore conditions previously accepted have no strong reason to be remedied & no vigorous action need be taken to alleviate them. / The error lies in neglect of probabilities. All the conditions are risks and the FRR [Flight Readiness Review] determines if they are acceptable risks. We fly a given flight because the risks are judged to be acceptable - the probabilities of failure small enough. Effort must be continuous to decrease the probabilities of risk by studying the items of the highest (altho low) risk that was accepted for the previous flight & the condition is limited (increase redundancy etc) so that the probability of risk is reduced next time.
4. 'Strenuous efforts to attack a risk item would call attention to that item and NASA's concern. This would deteriorate confidence that the public and crew have in NASA.' One must not admit that some risk is accepted in each flight. If one must not admit reality and this is the source of the 'fairyland' feeling I get reading NASA reports (eg certification reports, budget reports, reliability estimates, etc.)''
Feynman continues on the verso of the sheet, beginning the transcription of an exchange between him and Mike Weeks, the deputy associate administrator (technical) for space flight at NASA. He writes,
''Weeks. FRR each review if OK for flight.
Me But this is different from effort to fix - to fix sources of [?]. It even may enhance belief [that] fault (erosion, cracks) are acceptable & do not have to be attended to vigorously.
Weeks. In most calamities Nature has given us a warning. (erosion, cracks)
Me We must pay active attention to such warnings. / This should be a high priority vigorous pursuit by some department in charge of riding herd on anything that is not operating as designed.''
Feynman then lays out his theory regarding the process of the poor decision making, ''Theory: Mulloy [Lawrence Mulloy, the NASA SRB project manager who overruled his engineers' objections to the launch] honestly thought the seals were very good, that erosion and blow-by are trivial and in no way compromised the joints or put any doubt on SRB ability to fly.
Hence when he hears the early Thiokol 53° decision he is 'sure' it is wrong - 'knows' O-rings (eg in automobiles) work virtually independent of temperature to way below freezing - [therefore] honesty believes.
MTI [Morton-Thiokol Inc.] engineers are wrong (stupid or overly conservative etc). Hence surprised and 'appalled', points out first [?] he can against their 'mistaken' view (at high T=75 also got blow-by), asks for reconsideration. Next hears only that MTI says OK, thinks engineers have come to their senses (not being informed of their continuing disagreement) and the previous MTI 53° recommendation just a momentary aberration or overconservatism which they have been earily [sic] convinced is so. Therefore the 53° was not a serious careful opinion that needs or deserves to be sent up to higher levels. They simply had changed their mind and Kilmeister? [Joseph Kilminster, MTI executive who overruled his engineers and ok'd the flight for launch] What did he think?''
At this point in his analysis, Feynman seems to give the decision makers more credit than he ultimately does in his Rogers Commission minority report, where he excoriates NASA executives as living in ''fantasy''. It clearly reveals the seriousness in which Feynman took his role as Commissioner and his edict to let the facts always lead him. Two page document on a single sheet measures 8.375'' x 11''. Near fine condition. From the estate of Richard Feynman.
Richard Feynman Handwritten Diary-Style Document, Trying to Understand the Faulty Decision Making at NASA After the Challenger Disaster -- ''...the 'fairyland' feeling I get reading NASA reports...''
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